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Eliminating Consideration of Parental Wealth in
Post-Divorce Child Custody Disputes
Carolyn J. Frantz

There may be no story as old as that of the child of privilege,
spoiled in the things of the world, who finally achieves happiness
through coming to appreciate the simple charms of working-class life.
But equal in strength are the real life stories of American parents:
their drive for the accumulation of personal wealth, so frequently justi
fied as "for the children." The place of wealth in the good life of a
child is deeply controversial, and it should surprise no one to see it
played out in child custody law.
Under the statutes of almost all states, custody disputes between
divorcing parents must be decided in the "best interests of the child."1
These statutes often list particular factors that are to be considered
when deciding children's interests, such as "[t]he love, affection, and
other emotional ties existing between the parties involved and the
child."2 Some statutes also expressly forbid consideration of particular
factors, such as the gender of the parent.3 Even with these attempts to
narrow the inquiry, the best-interests standard remains notably vague.4
This inevitably leads to serious disputes about which factors ought to
be considered, and how much weight they should be given. Perhaps
the most troubling of these disputes has involved the relevance to the
custody decision of each parent's ability to provide the child with ma
terial goods.
A few states address this issue directly in their child custody stat
utes. Florida and Michigan explicitly provide that parental ability to

1. E.g., ALASKA STAT.§ 25.24.150(c) (Michie 1998) ("The court shall determine custody
in accordance with the best interests of the child."). For a comprehensive list of these stat
utes, see Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1975, at 226, 236-37 nn.45-47 (1975).
The "best interests of the child" standard defies easy definition. For a fuller discussion,
see infra text accompanying notes 23-32. The standard does not apply outside of divorce cus
tody cases, where custody determinations are between parents and nonparents. The due
process clause protects parents' interests in the nondestruction of their families unless a state
can show sufficient harm to the child. See generally Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982).
2. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 722.23(a) (West 1993).
3. E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-lOl(a) (Michie 1998) ("In an action for divorce, the
award of custody of the children of the marriage shall be made without regard to the sex of
the parent.").
4. See Mnookin, supra note 1, at 256 (discussing the "inherent indeterminacy of the
best-interests standard").

216

October 2000]

Eliminating Consideration ofParental Wealth

217

satisfy a child's material needs is a factor in custody determinations.5
Missouri explicitly forbids consideration of a parent's financial re
sources.6 Oregon allows its consideration only where the child is suf
fering emotional or physical harm.7 Most states, however, leave the is
sue to the discretion of the courts, who are asked to interpret broad
statutory requirements like "the capability and desire of each parent
to meet [the child's] needs"8 or "[t]he health, safety, and welfare of the
child"9 or catch-all provisions like "other factors that the court consid
ers pertinent."10
In a sense, considering wealth in child custody decisions is the ob
vious choice. Rhetoric underlying calls for better enforcement of child
support and expressions of concern about the effects of welfare reform
seem to presuppose that access to economic resources is an essential
component of children's welfare.11 Society is committed to the view
that money matters to children. Many courts take this view, often con
sidering financial factors without pausing to provide further justifica
tion.12 Even where courts are not explicit about the relevance of pa
rental income, empirical evidence shows that they frequently take it
into consideration.13
5. FLA. STAT. ch. 61.13(3)(c) (2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(c) (West 1993).
6. MO. REV. STAT. § 452.375.6 (1994).
7. OR. REV. STAT. § 107.137(3) (1999).
8. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(2) (Michie 1998).
9. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3011 (West 1994).
10. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(c)(9) (Michie 1998).
11. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477, 538-39 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Albergottie v. James, 470 A.2d 266, 271-72 (D.C. 1983); In re Marriage of
Wilhelm, 491 N.W.2d 171, 172 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); Hadamik v. Hadamik, 644 N.Y.S.2d
814, 816 (App. Div. 1996); White v. White, 506 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1973); Fanning v. Fanning,
717 P.2d 346, 353 (Wyo. 1986).
13. See Carol R. Lowery, Child Custody Decisions in Divorce Proceedings: A Survey of
Judges, 12 PROF. PSYCHOL. 492, 494 (1981) (finding that judges ranked parents' financial
sufficiency as fourteenth in a list of twenty suggested factors for awarding child custody,
giving it a mean importance rank of 6.97 on an importance scale of 1 (of little importance) to
11 (highly important)); Leighton E. Stamps, Seth Kunen, & Robert Lawyer, Judicial Atti
tudes Regarding Custody and Visitation Issues, 25 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 23, 33 (1996)
(finding that in a survey of judges asking them to rate the importance of various factors in
their child-custody decisionmaking on a scale of 1 (not very important) to 5 (very impor
tant), the average rating for "[t]he capacity of the parents to provide the child with food,
clothing, medical care, and material needs" was 3.9); Jennifer E. Horne, Note, The Brady
Bunch and Other Fictions: How Courts Decide Child Custody Disputes Involving Remarried
Parents, 45 STAN. L. REV. 2073, 2120-21 (1993) (finding that courts mention economic fac

tors more than any other specific factors).
Similar results have also been found in studies of clinicians asked to evaluate child cus
tody placements. Clinicians' evaluations are often heavily relied upon by courts in their cus
tody decisions. See Carol R. Lowery, Child Custody Evaluations: Criteria and Clinical Impli
cations, 14 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 35, 37 (1985) (finding that clinicians ranked
parents' financial sufficiency as seventeenth most important in a list of twenty-six factors,
giving it a 7.35 rank on a scale of 1 (of little importance) to 11 (highly important)).
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Despite the strength of the intuition that wealth must be relevant
to children's interests, this Note recommends eliminating considera
tion of financial factors in child custody determinations, except when
one parent cannot, even with child support payments, provide for the
child in a minimally adequate manner. This position is consistent with
recent statutory developments in Missouri and Oregon,14 as well as a
well-established common law rule in Pennsylvania,15 which courts in
other states have adopted.16 States may eliminate consideration of
wealth through either the statutory or common law route.17
14. See Mo. REV. STAT.§ 452.375.6 (1994) ("As between the parents of a child, no pref
erence may be given to either parent in the awarding of custody because of that parent's age,
sex, or financial status, nor because of the age or sex of the child."); OR. REV. STAT. §
107.137(3) ("In determining custody of a minor child under ORS 107.105 or 107.135, the
court shall consider the conduct, marital status, income, social environment or life style of
either party only if it is shown that any of these factors are causing or may cause emotional
or physical damage to the child.").
15. See Brooks v. Brooks, 466 A.2d 152, 156 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); In re Custody of
Pearce, 456 A.2d 597, 599-600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); In re Wesley J.K., 445 A.2d 1243, 1245
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1982); G. J.F. v. K.B.F., 425 A.2d 459, 460-61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981);
Pennsylvania ex rel. Cutler v. Cutler, 369 A.2d 821, 824 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
16. See In re Marriage of Gravatt, 371 N.W.2d 836, 840 (Iowa Ct. App. 1985); Boyd v.
Boyd, 647 So. 2d 414, 417-18 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Bailey v. Bailey, 527 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (La.
Ct. App. 1988); Rosiana C. v. Pierre S., 594 N.Y.S.2d 316, 317 (App. Div. 1993); Bilodeau v.
Bilodeau, 557 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (App. Div. 1990).
17. Despite some controversy about the use of common law rules, they are a generally
well accepted and desirable tool for improving the quality of judicial decisionmaking, even in
the highly discretionary area of family law. Even without explicit legislative authorization,
courts are empowered to create common law rules to improve their decisionmaking under
the statute. Child custody disputes are precisely the kinds of situations where courts' power
to constrain their own discretion can be essential to achieving the ultimate goal of furthering
the interests of the child. Such judicial common law rulemaking may have been the aim of
legislatures in adopting such a broad standard for child custody determinations. Carl
Schneider has referred to the best interests standard as exemplifying "rule-building" discre
tion - discretion that is awarded in the hopes that, with experience and time, courts will de
velop better rules than the legislature could have developed ex ante. Carl E. Schneider, Dis
cretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L.
REV. 2215, 2244 (1991). This may be the reason that judicially crafted common law rules are
common in the child custody context. See Marsha Garrison, How Do Judges Decide Divorce
Cases? An Empirical Analysis of Discretionary Decision Making, 74 N.C. L. REV. 401, 514
(1996). In fact, in his discussion of the optimal mix of rules and discretion in child custody
decisionmaking, Carl Schneider recommends that courts move farther in the direction of
carving out presumptions and rules within the broad best interests of the child standard.
Schneider, supra, at 2297. This approach is also preferred by Mary Ann Glendon. Mary Ann
Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60
TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1170 (1986).
The most famous of these cominon law rules is West Virginia's primary caretaker pre
sumption, where courts were bound to award custody to the parent who had provided the
greatest degree of daily care in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary. The ra
tionale behind this rule was that being placed with the primary caretaker was more often
than not the better placement for the child, and that constraining judicial discretion in this
way would lead to better results for children in the aggregate. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d
357 (W. Va. 1981).
Although the fact that imposing constraints on judicial discretion in custody decisions
asks judges to blind themselves to some factors in an individual case in order to secure
greater overall accuracy may seem problematic, it can easily be justified. In adopting a com-
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This Note takes a child-centered approach, arguing that eliminat
ing consideration of wealth in judicial determinations of post-divorce
child custody may further the interests of children. Although, as Part I
demonstrates, the possession of wealth is clearly relevant to children's
interests, Part II shows that judicial consideration of wealth, beyond
the level of basic subsistence, may lead to decisions that are not in
children's interests. Wealth allows the distorting influence of socio
economic biases and cognitive errors, obscures the importance of child
support as a means of meeting children's financial needs, and creates
harmful incentives for parental behavior in divorce litigation. Part Ill
briefly defends an exception that allows consideration of wealth when
minimal subsistence is implicated.
I.

THE RELEVANCE OF WEALTH

As an initial matter, wealth obviously plays a role in a child's well
being. It does not necessarily follow, though, that judicial considera
tion of this factor will result in better child custody decisionmaking.
Using the rules of evidence as a metaphor, the relevance of all infor
mation must be weighed against the possibility that its inclusion will
distort the decisionmaking process more than it enables it.18 This Part
discusses the first half of this balancing test: the relevance of wealth to
children's interests.
Because the conclusion that financial resources are important to
children's interests is so strongly intuitive, it may seem that there is lit
tle need to defend wealth as a relevant factor in determining the best
interests of the child. Nevertheless, two California courts, and a few
commentators,19 have challenged even this basic intuition, so some
thing in the way of defense is required. This Note objects to the con
sideration of wealth in child custody decisionmaking, but not for the
simple reason that it does not matter to children. The relevance of
wealth must be asserted fairly before the case against it can be made.
Section I.A demonstrates that wealth is in fact relevant to the best
interests of the child. Section LB discusses the broader social concerns
that lead courts and commentators to deny the relevance of wealth.

mon law rule, courts are not, as it may appear, sacrificing the interests of the particular child
who is the subject of the litigation to the interests of children in general. Rather, a common
law is created when judges wish to stop themselves from considering wealth because they
could never really know when they were considering it appropriately, and because they are
more likely to be wrong than right in any given case. To put the matter another way, no one
ever decides a case under a common law rule knowing with any degree of certainty that it is
to the disadvantage of any particular child.

18. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 provides that evidence is not admissible if the possi
bility of prejudice from inclusion outweighs its probative value. FED. R. Evm. 403.
19. See infra note 33.
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Section LC issues a few caveats to the relevance of wealth: although it
is clearly relevant, its importance is frequently overstated.
A. Why Wealth Matters
Although the question of how to determine the best interests of
the child is controversial,20 the most commonly accepted notions of the
standard are child-centered. The best interests of the child standard
was adopted precisely because of fears that the child's perspective was
lost in the storm that resulted from each parent, with his or her lawyer,
advocating for adult interests. The new test was intended to keep the
court's focus on what is good for the child.21
The view that financial resources are not relevant to children's
positive experience of life is rightly dismissed as "idealistic. "22 On each
of the two most influential child-centered views of children's best in
terests, wealth matters. One of these views, advanced by David
Chambers, advocates decisionmaking based on a child's hypothetical
future assessment of the custody choice; i.e., decisions are evaluated
based on how positively the child will experience them.23 As Chambers
recognizes, on this view, wealth matters. Access to financial resources
makes one's experience of life, generally speaking, better. Wealth in
creases access to positive opportunities and decreases the likelihood of
various negative traumas, such as transportation difficulties, home
lessness, hunger, and serious illness without adequate medical care.24
A relationship between socioeconomic status and reported happiness
has been documented, as well as a relationship between socioeco
nomic status and reported life satisfaction.25 Lower socioeconomic
status increases sources of stress26 and is correlated with lower self
esteem in children of divorced families.27 Studies have shown that a

20. See generally Mnookin, supra note 1 (describing the potential for controversy inher
ent in such an uncertain standard).
21. Chambers, supra note 11, at 487.
22. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L.

REV. 1, 28 (1987).

23. See generally Chambers, supra note 11.
24. See id. at 539-40.
25. See MICHAEL ARGYLE, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF HAPPINESS 91-97 (1987); ANGUS
CAMPBELL, THE SENSE OF WELL-BEING IN AMERICA 58, 241 (1981).
26. See generally Alan C. Acock & K. Jill Kiecolt, Is It Family Structure or Socio
economic Status? Family Structure During Adolescence and Adult Adjustment, 68 Soc.

FORCES 553 (1989).

27. See generally N.J. Shook & J. Jurich, Correlates of Self-Esteem Among College Off
spring from Divorce Families: A Study of Sex-Based Differences, 18 J. DIVORCE &

REMARRIAGE No. 18-3/4, at 157 (1992).
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radical lowering of socioeconomic status upon divorce can cause psy
chological problems in children.28
A competing child-centered view is advanced by Jon Elster, whose
conception of children's best interests is aimed at protecting a child's
autonomy.29 Under this test, the best interest standard secures for
children the ability to make their own choices as they develop the ca
pability to do so. He too recognizes that under his view of children's
best interests, wealth is clearly relevant.30 Except for children of very
affluent parents,31 increasing availability of financial resources also in
creases their access to opportunities for autonomous choice through access to education, travel, and cultural activities, as well as
the more basic human goods.32
B. Denial and Broader Social Values
Given the clear relevance of wealth to children's best interests, it
may seem strange that anyone has argued otherwise. But they have: in
particular, California courts (and several commentators) have claimed
that wealth has nothing to do with the best interests of the child.33
Because wealth is so obviously relevant to children's interests,
these arguments are better read as appeals for consideration of other
concerns. Denying the relevance of wealth to the best interests of the
child may be another way of inserting the interests of third parties and
28. See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES:
WHAT HAPPENS TO CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 71 (1991):
Quite often their distress is rooted in, or at least intensified by, financial problems. Loss of
the father's income can cause a disruptive, downward spiral in which children must adjust to
a declining standard of living, a mother who is less psychologically available and is home less
often, an apartment in an unfamiliar neighborhood, a different school, and new friends.
Id. at 71. See also JAMES A. TWAITE ET AL., CHILDREN OF DIVORCE: ADJUSTMENT,
PARENTAL CONFLICT, CUSTODY, REMARRIAGE, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
CLINICIANS 178-85 (1998).

29. See generally Elster, supra note 22.
30. See id.
31. At some point, the diminishing margin of return makes access to further resources
not particularly significant for the welfare of children.
32. See Elster, supra note 22, at 15, 28.
33. In re Marriage of Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (Cal. App. 1990) (stating that by
relying upon the father's greater financial resources, the lower court "improperly presume[d]
that children should live in the community of the parent who is wealthier. This factor has
nothing to do with the best interests of the child."); Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491
(Cal. 1986) ("The trial court's decision referred to William's better economic position, and
to matters such as homeownership and ability to provide a more 'wholesome environment '
which reflect economic advantage. But . . . '[T]here is no basis for assuming a correlation
between wealth and good parenting or wealth and happiness. '") (citing Ramsay Laing Klaff,
The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335, 350 (1982)). See also Nancy D.
Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody De
terminations, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 175 (1992).
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other social values into the custody determination.34 Concerns about
sex discrimination have been particularly prevalent in discussions of
the issue, and likely drive most attempts to eliminate wealth as a fac
tor.35 For instance, in In re Marriage of Fingert, a California Court of
Appeals attempted to justify its claim that wealth was irrelevant by
stating:
[W]omen are more likely to be unemployed than men and, when they
are employed, earn less, regardless of race or level of education. Any
rule based on the relative wealth of parents will almost invariably favor
men. Such a ruling has the effect of discriminating against women.36

Unfairness to women is an unfortunate consequence of considering
wealth in child custody determinations. In general, mothers have less
access to financial resources than their male counterparts, due largely
to the legacy of the patriarchal family. This wealth disparity has two
types of causes. The effect of discrimination in wages and hiring, and
the greater likelihood that women will choose to remain out of the
workforce to care for their children.37 Differentials caused by discrimi
nation are almost uncontestedly unfair to women.38 Wealth effects
caused by women's life choices should also be a cause for concern, de
spite arguments that women's exercise of autonomous choice should
be sufficient to guard against unfairness.39 The fact that the choices of
social roles in this context are particularly constrained by the residual
influence of patriarchy,40 along with skepticism about whether it is
34. Jon Elster argues that the desire to further various policy preferences, rather than
secure children's interests, explains the reluctance to consider wealth in custody detennina
tions. Elster, supra note 22, at 27-28.
35. Scott Altman, Should Child Custody Rules be Fair?, 35 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L.
325, 329 (1996-1997) ("Some states exclude parental wealth from custody decisions to vindi
cate norms of equality."). A Michigan Court of Appeals court recently cautioned: "This
court recognizes that placing undue reliance on [the financial] factor is unfair because in
most cases the mother, as homemaker, will be disadvantaged." Mazurkiewicz v.
Mazurkiewicz, 417 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Mich. App. 1987).
36. 271 Cal. Rptr. 389, 392 (App. 1990). Nancy Polikoff makes a similar connection:
"There is no necessary correlation between economic dominance and the best interests of
children. In fact, the dominant parent is likely to have achieved that status . . . through the
operation of sex discrimination and sex segregation in the workplace." Polikoff, supra note
33, at 179.
37. See Chambers, supra note 11, at 540.
38. See id.
39. Chambers argues that:
If there were no gender discrimination in wages, and the only disparity in earnings came
from the fact that one parent had participated less in the labor market in order to care for
her children, it would not be bothersome that parents who assume differing roles ... during
marriage permitted them at separation to offer differing advantages to the child.

Chambers, supra note 11, at 540-541; see Porter v. Porter, 274 N.W.2d 235, 241-42 (N.D.
1979).
40. The fact of constrained choice also provides an argument against claims sometimes
made that mothers should be rewarded for the particularly meritorious sacrifices they make
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good to encourage parties to make choices during marriage that con
template divorce,41 counsels against relying simply on parental choice
to gauge equity.
Another social value that may underlie attempts to eliminate con
sideration of wealth from custody determinations is the desire to sup
port cultural pluralism - diversity in the lifestyles and beliefs of
members of society - through family law.42 Courts are generally re
luctant to decide which families children should live with based on cer
tain types of social differences between parents. Since the family oper
ates as an important element in society, where people's values and
interests are shaped and expressed, courts are rightly reluctant to use
their power to force families to reflect values and beliefs that are
deeply contested.43 Correspondingly, courts avoid using racial or re
ligious factors in placing children.44 When disputes are between par
ents and nonparents, courts emphatically refuse to consider wealth.45
choosing the caretaking role. See, e.g., Bilodeau v. Bilodeau, 557 N.Y.S.2d 471, 472 (N.Y.
1990); Horne, supra note 13, at 2122-24; Mnookin, supra note 1, at 284 (1975); Susan Beth
Jacobs, The Hidden Gender Bias Behind "The Best Interest of the Child" Standard in Cus
tody Decisions, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845, 857 (1997). See also Altman, supra note 35, at
336-37 (arguing that primary caretaking involves sacrifices that are more meritorious than
earning). Men may feel as constrained by sex roles from staying home with their children as
women do from remaining in the workplace.
in

41. The notion that parents should accept the post-divorce fate that they have chosen
goes against the commonly-held notion that we should neither expect nor encourage parents
to make their choices based on the likelihood of divorce. While it is true that divorce is
common, few people enter into a marriage with full awareness of that possibility. See Lynn
A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship is Above Average: Perceptions and
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 (1993).
To award custody to parents based on what they have to offer as individuals after having
encouraged them to provide goods to their children as a unit appears strikingly contradic
tory.
42. See Elster, supra note 22, at 27-28 (describing the reason behind eliminating consid
erations of wealth: "[a] society committed to the value of equality must sometimes treat its
citizens as equal when in fact they are not.").
43. See Ferdinand Schoeman, Rights of Children, Rights of Par.mts, and the Moral Basis
of the Family, 91 ETHICS6 (1980). But see David A. J. Richards, The Individual, The Family,
and the Constitution: A Jurisprudential Perspective, 55 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1, 31-39 (1980) (criti
cizing the Supreme Court's tendency to attach these values to the family, rather than the in
dividual).
This demand for neutrality on contested social issues has been one of the classic justifi
cations for parental rights. See generally David J. Herring, Rearranging the Family: Diversity,
Pluralism, Social Tolerance and Child Custody Disputes, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 205
(1997). But cf Carl E. Schneider, Rights Discourse and Neonatal Euthanasia, 76 CAL. L.
REV. 151, 160-61 (1988) (suggesting that our present law may not be consistent with plural
ism and that the concept may be too vague to be useful); James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion
and Children's Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371,
1442-46 (1994) (arguing that the interest in pluralism is not sufficient to justify parental
rights).
44. See infra note 48.
45. See DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1993) (per Stevens, J. in chambers)
("[C]ourts are not free to take children from parents simply by deciding another home offers
more advantages.") (quoting In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992)); In re J.M.P.,
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Differences in social class are as central a part of the nation's diversity
as race or religion.46 Of course, making decisions between two parents
based on wealth does not pose nearly as large a threat to a plural cul
ture,47 but discomfort with preferences for higher-class existence must
at least partly explain the calls to eliminate this factor.
Whether to consider broader social values in custody decisions that
are supposed to be made in the best interests of the child is extremely
controversial.48 But courts ought to be honest when making decisions
for these reasons, and not use the legal structure of the interests of
children as a means to secure other ends. Although introducing
broader social values into custody decisions may be desirable, it does
528 So. 2d 1002, 1015 (La. 1988) (holding that a "broad social policy" of noninterference in
families outweighs any consideration of material advantage); Jn re Guardianship of Doney,
570 P.2d 575, 578 (Mont. 1977) ("Manifestly, the expression 'welfare of the child' was never
intended to penalize a parent because he may not be financially able to provide his child
with the comforts and advantages which more fortunate parents may provide for their chil
dren.") (quoting Ex Parte Bourquin, 290 P. 250, 251-52 (Mont. 1930)); In re Adoption of L.,
462 N.E.2d 1165, 1170 (N.Y. 1984) ("emphatically" rejecting consideration of financial fac
tors because mother's poverty "should not be held against her" (citing New York ex rel.
Scarpetta v. Spence-Chapin Adoption Serv., 269 N.E.2d 787, 792 (N.Y. 1971); Bennett v.
Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976); People ex rel. Portnoy v. Strasser, 104 N.E.2d 895
(N.Y. 1952).
This point is made particularly eloquently in Larson v. Dutton, 172 N.W. 869, 873 (1919)
(Bronson, J., dissenting):
If such be the rule, well might the bright, intelligent child in the humblest home of poor, de
voted parents be taken and given to the home much better provided and with much greater
facilities existing, owing to the prominence and wealth of the owners, but strangers to the
child, when, in the viewpoint of the chancellor, the best welfare of the child, as a future citi
zen of this state, would be subserved. Such applications of equity do violence to the . . . as
surance that modern society and civilization has given to them; the assurance that, no matter
how humble their home may be, or how little of this world's possessions they may have, their
child, begotten by them, shall remain with them. . . .
46. See Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74

TEXAS L. REV. 1847, 1885-88 (1996). Even though class diversity may be an important ele

ment of a plural society, race and religion probably lay much stronger claims. For instance,
governmental campaigns to redistribute wealth are not nearly as problematic as campaigns
to eliminate religious differences.
47. See Carl E. Schneider, Religion and Child Custody, 25 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 879,
888 (1992).

48. It is undeniable that, where social matters are particularly important, many instances
of child custody adjudication reflect social values as well as the interest of the child involved.
Even where there is no clear mandate to do so, courts often refuse to consider the effects of
parental disability, race, religion, use of day care (reflecting a concern with sex discrimina
tion), and sometimes even sexual orientation. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Short, 698 P.2d
1310 (Colo. 1985); Holt v. Chenault, 722 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. 1987); Ireland v. Smith, 542
N.W.2d 344 (Mich. Ct. App. 1995); M.A.B. v. R.B., 510 N.Y.S.2d 960 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1986);
Stone v. Stone, 133 P.2d 526 (Wash. 1943); Jn re Marriage of Hadeen, 619 P.2d 374 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1980); Welker v. Welker, 129 N.W.2d 134 (Wis. 1964).
Yet there is legitimate cause for concern that considering broader social values may
dwarf the interests of children. See Chambers, supra note 11, at 499-503; Wendy Anton
Fitzgerald, Maturity, Difference, and Mystery: Children's Perspectives and the Law, 36 ARIZ.
L. REV. 11, 53 (1994). But see Naomi R. Cahn, Reframing Child Custody Decisionmaking, 58
OHIO ST. L. J. 1, 49-50 (1997) (arguing that children's interests and other social interests of
ten overlap).
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no good to confuse the issue by cloaking these values in the language
of the best interest of the child. Whatever may be said for considering
social values and third party interests, they do not necessarily coincide
with the interests of children. This Note aims to give more honest, de
tailed, and child-centered arguments against the use of wealth in child
custody decisions.
C.

Qualifying the Importance of Wealth

Some caution is necessary in asserting the relevance of wealth to
children's best interests. First, the importance of wealth tends to be
overestimated in relation to other factors. Though it is undeniably
relevant, wealth plays a very limited role in life satisfaction, all things
considered.49 People have a tendency to exaggerate the importance of
wealth to well-being.5° For this reason, courts ought to be cautious
when assessing the importance of wealth in relation to other factors.
Second, it is difficult to isolate wealth from the other factors that
matter to children's interests. This interrelationship among factors
raises the possibility that wealth is correlated with other features such as a lack of commitment to or interest in the child - that cut in
the other direction, making custody with the wealthier parent also dis
advantageous. The strong claim, that possession of greater financial
resources necessarily indicates lesser commitment to the child, cannot
be supported. But a weaker claim, that some decisions to amass per
sonal wealth may suggest a lower priority on the interests of children,
should at least temper enthusiasm for custody with the wealthier par
ent.
Mary Becker has made the strong claim that the wealthier parent is
very likely to also be the worse parent, for reasons directly correlated
with the possession· of wealth.51 According to Becker, the parent who
makes financial sacrifices for the child is, by definition, more commit
ted. Becker speaks in a general way about sex role differences, oper
ating on the quite defensible assumption that women tend to be the
less wealthy parents. But her argument can easily be individualized
into the economic claim that, gender aside, the possession of wealth is
proof that one is a less committed parent:
Women's poor economic status relative to men [in part) reflects women's
greater commitment to children. . . . If women and men were equally

49. See ARGYLE, supra note 25, at 95 ("[C]lass and income have a definite, but quite
small, effect on happiness.").
50. See CAMPBELL, supra note 25, at 59 ("It is always better to be rich than poor. This is
a fact which is universally understood: what is not so well-recognized is how modest this rela
tionship is and how many other influences come into play in determining an individual's
feelings of well-being.").
&

51. Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo, and Child Custody, 1 S. CAL. REV. L.
WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 157 (1992).
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concerned about children's welfare, women would refuse to bear and
raise children, given the economic consequences, unless men . . . trans
ferred sufficient assets to women to offset their economic loss in wage la
bor. Therefore, women's poor economic status is itself evidence of their
commitment to, concern for, and emotional investment with, children.52

Because the work of raising children interferes with the accumulation
of wealth, Becker asserts that the possession of wealth can itself serve
as evidence of a lack of parental commitment.
In its strongest form - using wealth as a direct indication of the
level of commitment of different parents - Becker's claim is flawed
from an economic perspective. In a world where women are discrimi
nated against in the employment market and receive lower wages than
men for the same labor, women do not have the power to strike the
sort of bargain with men that Becker proposes.53 Their choice is not
between making a "male" salary or having children - if it were, they
could perhaps demand from devoted fathers that the burdens of hav
ing and raising children be equally distributed between both parents.
But this is not the world women live in - what a woman gives up in
wages in exchange for raising a child is considerably less than what a
man would sacrifice. Even between equally committed parents, the ra
tional baby-bargain would leave women with a lower income. Thus,
economic inequality cannot serve as direct evidence of parental com
mitment in our society.54
Even if Becker's strong claim were true, it could not alone justify
the complete exclusion of wealth from the best interests detennina
tion. Becker's arguments essentially use a lack of wealth as a proxy for
parental commitment. But the commitment of the parent to the child,
although very important, is only one among many factors relevant to a
child's best interests, however defined.55 Becker's claim would merely
indicate that the presence of one factor (wealth) is good evidence for a
discrepancy in another factor (parental commitment). It does not
show that wealth is not itself important to children's welfare. Wealth
could still operate as a tie-breaker between equally committed par
ents, or even as a benefit that could outweigh the burden of being
placed with a less committed parent.
Softened somewhat, however, Becker's argument issues an impor
tant caution that should be taken seriously. Courts should be aware of
the prospect that, for some parents with greater financial resources,
this may be the most they have to offer. Wealth may sometimes be a
52. Id. at 157.

53. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, ILLUSIONS OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC
AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM 37, 197-99 nn.3-7 (1991).
54. Becker additionally fails to account for situations where wealth is unrelated to wage
earning, such as when it is inherited, won in the lottery, or provided through remarriage.
55. See supra text accompanying note 2.
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sign of parental priorities that work against the interests of their chil
dren. The possibility that wealth may sometimes, though certainly not
always, be correlated with other parental features that are less than
beneficial for children makes unqualified support for custody with the
wealthier parent inappropriate. As this section shows, wealth has a
clear, although not an absolute, role in the best interests of the child.
II.

THE PROBLEM WITH C ONSIDERING WEALTH

Despite the relevance of wealth to children's best interests, consid
eration of financial factors can lead to distorted judicial decisionmak
ing that can work against the interests of the child. This Part argues
that considering wealth in child custody determinations leads to four
significant problems that may ultimately make it better for children if
wealth is ignored. Section II.A discusses the distorting impact of so
cioeconomic biases, causing judges to take wealth and wealth
correlated factors more seriously than they merit. Section II.B argues
that a different effect, the tendency in a multi-factor analysis to give
disproportionate weight to factors that can be known with certainty,
will lead judges to give wealth more importance than it deserves. Sec
tion 11.C demonstrates how consideration of wealth in child custody
determinations invites judges to use custody to avoid large child sup
port orders. This lessens the ability of these two tools - child support
and custody - to work together to maximize the welfare of children
post-divorce. Finally, Section 11.D shows that consideration of wealth
encourages parents to engage in various activities, such as increased
litigation, that are detrimental to children.
A. Judicial Bias
Upper and middle-class family court judges are not immune from
pervasive socio-economic biases. Most judges are reasonably wealthy,
and it is common to exaggerate the importance of the features of one's
own lifestyle.56 Of course, a judge would be correct in believing that
family wealth makes some difference in children's well-being.57 The
problem with bias is that it leads to an exaggerated perception of these
effects. In general, discretion in the best interests determination gives
free reign to such distorting unconscious biases, resulting in custody
awards that are not necessarily in the best interests of the child.58
56. See Fitzgerald, supra note 48, at 62. Courts note the "clean[liness]" of the higher
earning parent, see, e.g., White v. White, 506 P.2d 69, 70 (Utah 1973), or that parent's
"stab[ility]," see, e.g., In re Marriage of Wilhelm, 491 N.W.2d 171, 172 (Iowa 1992). Emphasis
is also placed on various upper-class values such as the ability of the child to have his or her
own room. Hadamik v. Hadamik, 644 N.Y.S.2d 814, 816 (N.Y. App. 1996).
57. See infra Section I.A.
58. See Schneider, supra note 17, at 2267-68.
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A similar problem has been clearly noted with considerations of
race in custody decisions.59 The Supreme Court's decision in Palmore
v. Sidoti/'0 which held unconstitutional judicial consideration of the ef
fects of racial prejudice in deciding whether to place a child in the cus
tody of a mixed-race couple, gave constitutional status to concerns
about judicial racial bias. The decision has been read as creating a con
stitutional common law rule to counter racist unconscious biases:
[T]aking all child custody decisions into account, and in particular being
aware that family court judges themselves may be infected with biases
that lead them to make distorted all-things-considered judgments, the
Court concluded that the formalist rule barring consideration of private
racial biases would lead to more accurate determinations of what was in
the child's best interests than a rule allowing family court judges to take
everything into account.61

Biases about wealth raise similar concerns about distorted judicial
decisionmaking. A common law rule against considering wealth is not
constitutionally required because wealth is not a characteristic: pro
tected by heightened scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment.62 As
a policy matter, however, the same considerations that led the Court
to constrain discretion in Palmore make such a rule a desirable tool
for ensuring that children end up in the best placement.
Judicial bias is; of course, common in areas other than wealth. One
commentator has pointed out that judges are equally likely to over
emphasize "being articulate, attractive, well-educated, or well59. See Twila L. Perry, Race and Child Placement: The Best Interests Test and the Cost of
Discretion, 29 J. FAM. L. 51 (199011991).
60. 466 U.S. 429 (1984). Palmore was explicitly cited as support for the refusal to con
sider wealth by the California appeals court in In re Marriage of Fingert, 271 Cal. Rptr. 389
(Ct. App. 1990).
61. See Mark V. Tushnet, The Hardest Question in Constitutional Law, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 1, 16 (1996). The connection between Palmore and consideration of wealth in child
custody determinations is made, although ultimately rejected, in Altman, supra note 35, at
328-30.
62. See San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14.25 (5th ed. 1995). As to the application of rational basis scrutiny
to this matter, see Dempsey v. Dempsey, 292 N.W.2d 549 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on
other grounds, 296 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1980) ("The legislative determination that relative
economic circumstances be [considered] . . . has a rational basis.").
There have been some attempts to classify consideration of wealth as constitutionally
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex, because women typically have fewer resources
than men seeking custody of their children. See Martha L. Fineman & Anne Opie, The Uses
of Social Science Data in Legal Policymaking: Custody Determinations at Divorce, 1987
WISC. L. REV. 107, 136; Leonore Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Eco
nomic Consequences of Property, Alimony, and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV.
1181, 1241 (1981). At least under the law as it stands, it is difficult to make this claim. Al
though the consideration of wealth has a disporportoniate impact on women, it is difficult to
show that this consideration is motivated by a desire to discriminate against them, as the law
would require. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976). But see Becker, supra note 51,
at 175 (suggesting such a motive); Home, supra note 13, at 2121-22 (same).
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adjusted."63 He argues that it makes no sense to single out considera
tions of wealth for special condemnation, if we allow all of these other
factors to influence judicial decisionmaking. But there are reasons to
treat socio-economic bias differently than these other distorting fac
tors. First, outside of considerations of income, there is no comparable
evidentiary question to address: what is it that judges would do to
blind themselves to the impact of parental attractiveness? No matter
how problematic it is, there's little that can be realistically done to ad
dress it. Parental wealth is much different. If consideration of parental
wealth were forbidden, various pieces of evidence relating to this fac
tor would be excluded from the proceeding.64 Forming a common law
rule here makes a difference in addressing overvaluation of socio
economic status.
Further, it seems likely that judges already know that they are not
supposed to choose between parents on the basis of attractiveness or
articulateness. While these things may provide some value to a child,
judges easily recognize its limits.65 Judges may not be able to exclude
these considerations from their minds completely, but if asked the
question: "should you consider the parents' relative attractiveness in
making this custody determination?," the answer from almost all
judges would be "no". Most likely, the only reason that there is not al
ready a common law rule against consideration of these factors is that
no one has deemed it necessary. Consideration of socioeconomic
status, like consideration of racial prejudice, is substantially different.
As the disagreement between courts on this issue has shown, judges
asked to determine how important wealth is to any particular case
have a hard question to answer. The existence of this difficult question
is what makes the common law rule imperative - judges are less
clearly aware of their bias, and of the need to constrain it. A rule con
straining this bias is necessary, because the instincts to disregard the
factor are not well developed.

63. See Altman, supra note 35, at 333.

64. Precisely what evidence would be forbidden could be the subject of some debate.
Certainly, evidence about the balance in bank accounts and other sources of income would
be excluded. Presumably, as well, attempts could be made to eliminate evidence about the
size of each parent's house, or the toys that the child would have access to at either resi
dence. This latter category is more difficult, of course, because this evidence could also be
relevant to establishing more relevant factors.
65. One piece of evidence for the general perception that parental attractiveness would
of course not be relevant is that, in the surveys of what judges and counselors consider rele
vant factors for child custody determinations, no one even bothered to ask about it. See su
pra note 13 and accompanying text.
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The Problem of the Too-Clear Factor

Of all of the factors affecting children's best interests after divorce,
parental wealth is not the most important but is probably the easiest to
measure. Attachment to parents and other more ambiguous psycho
logical factors are generally much more central to children's inter
ests,66 but also are considerably more indeterminate. Courts looking at
these complicated issues will inevitably tend to give too much weight
to the wealth comparison, simply because of its clarity.67
Appellate courts complain that trial courts rely too heavily on fi
nancial factors in relation to more important intangible factors. This
critique is implicit when appellate courts overturn trial courts' custody
decisions on the basis that "while . . . consideration of the relative fi
nancial standing of the parents may be a relevant factor, it is not dis
positive."68 The existence of a number of reversals on these grounds
shows that trial courts do give inappropriate weight to financial factors
by treating them as dispositive in custody proceedings.69
There is a psychological explanation for the tendency of courts to
overvalue financial factors. Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
have discussed a common cognitive error called the "certainty ef
fect".70 People have an irrational tendency to overvalue clear out
comes in relation to ones they know with less certainty. Kahneman
and Tversky have recently applied this effect to the multivariable deci
sions involved in conflict resolution. In these sorts of negotiations,
they claim, parties have a tendency to overvalue certain outcomes,
such as land transfers, in relation to uncertain ones, such as goodwill.71

66. See ARGYLE, supra note 25; K.laff, supra note 33; Elizabeth Scott, Rational Deci
sionmaking about Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 34 n.75 (1990) ("[T)here is con
sensus that the relationship between parent and child is a more significant criterion than the
parent's economic status. . . .").
67. See Horne, supra note 13, at 2125 (expressing concern that care-giving skills tend to
be devalued because they are not "readily assigned a dollar value"). For a similar point in
the context of sexuality, see Nadler v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 63 Cal. Rptr.
352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967), in which the court expressed concern that the trial court had over
emphasized the mother's sexuality because it was a crude and obvious characteristic; more
important and subtle factors, the court held, had been obscured.
68. Scalia v. Scalia, 217 A.D.2d 780, 782 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
69. See Jennerjohn v. Jennerjohn, 203 N.W.2d 237, 243 (Iowa 1972); Dempsey v.
Dempsey, 292 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) ("Pre-eminent and decisive reliance
was placed upon defendant's superior economic position."), rev'd on other grounds, 96
N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1 980); Wellman v. Dutch, 604 N.Y.S.2d 381 (App. Div. 1993); Smith v.
Smith, 220 S.W.2d 627 (Tenn. 1949).
70. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Un
der Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979).
71. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Conflict Resolution: A Cognitive Perspec
tive, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 44 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al., eds. 1995) (dis
cussing cognitive effects through example of the benefits of goodwill compared with those of
land transfer).
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Even when an unclear possibility of goodwill is actually worth more to
a party, the party will still prefer the clearer, but lesser, benefits of
land transfer.
Child custody decisionmaking may operate in a similar manner.
Financial assets are certain, and other parental features, such as emo
tional attachment, are quite uncertain. The certainty effect thus pro
vides another reason why eliminating wealth as a factor may improve
the quality of judicial decisions overall.
C. Preserving the Child Support Solution
Several courts that have refused to consider the wealth of the re
spective parties in custody determinations have explicitly relied on
child support as the proper means to secure children's financial well
being.72 Commentators have also designated the child support obliga
tion as at least a partial solution to the problem of differential parental
financial resources.73 These courts and commentators are right about
child support, at least in a limited way. Refusing to consider wealth in
custody disputes is a way of ensuring that the possibility of lessening
wealth disparities through child support is taken seriously.
Child support cannot provide a complete answer to the problem of
wealth in child custody determinations, because it is only designed to
partially alleviate true financial disparities between parents. For ex
ample, some differences in parental wealth do not involve financial re
sources that are available for transfer through child support, such as
This effect is significantly different from the concern with the "dwarfing of soft vari
ables" expressed most famously by Laurence H. Tribe in Trial By Mathematics: Precision
and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1329, 1361-65 (1971). Tribe was con
cerned that, if statistical evidence were allowed in trials, it would take on too large a signifi
cance in jury deliberations because of the appearance of mathematical precision; see also
Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1669, 1704 (1975). Psychological evidence has failed to bear out this phenomenon. Jurors, in
fact, tend to undervalue statistical "base rate" evidence in relation to specific facts about a
case. See Brian C. Smith et al., Jurors' Use of Probabilistic Evidence, 20 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 49 (1996) (arguing against Tribe that jurors under-utilize probabilistic evidence);
Jonathan J. Koehler & Daniel Shaviro, Veridical Verdicts: Increasing Verdict Accuracy
Through the Use of Overtly Probabilistic Evidence and Methods, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 247
(1990).
This dismissal of Tribe's concern about the use of statistical base rates, however, does
not refute the impact of the certainty effect. Although statistics are quantified, they are no
more intrinsically certain than other evidence. Rather, all that statistics do is quantify the
degree of uncertainty in a factor. In fact, it may be just this uncertainty that causes them to
be undervalued. The court's ability to determine wealth, on the other hand, is quantifiably
certain.
72. See Burchard v. Garay, 724 P.2d 486, 491-92 (Cal. 1986); Boyd v. Boyd, 647 So. 2d
414, 418 (La. Ct. App. 1994); Bailey v. Bailey, 527 So. 2d 1030, 1033 (La. Ct. App. 1988);
Dempsey v. Dempsey, 292 N.W.2d 549, 553 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd on other grounds,
296 N.W.2d 813 (Mich. 1980); Gould v. Gould, 342 N.W.2d 426, 431 (Wis. 1984).
73. See Altman, supra note 35, at 339; Klaff, supra note 33, at 350-51; Mnookin, supra
note 1, at 284; Polikoff, supra note 33, at 179.
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resources from a parent's new spouse.74 These resources would be
available to a child in the remarried parent's household, but are not
funds eligible for transfer to the other parent.75
In addition, even when dealing with resources that are available to
be transferred through child support, the existing system does not con
template a complete redistribution of wealth in order to secure chil
dren's best interests: "[A] child support order may not accuratdy re
flect what children actually require but, rather, what the parent can
reasonably be expected to pay."76 State legislatures have further un
dercut the obligation in order to address issues of perceived fairness to
support-paying parents (typically fathers77) and their new families.78
Thus, even when all family resources are potentially eligible for child
support, and child support schemes are perfectly enforced, differen
tials in the financial resources available in different households will
remain.
Although child support cannot completely resolve the problem,
the benefits of using it to its fullest extent suggest another reason not
to consider wealth. If courts are allowed to consider financial factors
in custody, they may be motivated partly by the desire to lessen the
need for child support. Given the increasing popularity of the father's
rights movement, which frequently decries large child support pay
ments as unfair to a noncustodial parent, it is very likely that at least
some judges share the sentiment.79 Considerations of wealth can be
used to subvert the purposes and structures of this sometimes un
popular duty.80 In G.J.F. v. K.B.F. , a Pennsylvania court awarded cus
tody to the wealthier father partially so that he would not have to pro
vide child support, explicitly stating that if the father were granted
custody, he would not have to pay child support and "finance a second
household."81 What was explicit in G.J.F. is undoubtedly implicit in
other decisions.

74. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 4057.5(a) (West 1994) (exempting new mate's income
from the funds available for transfer through child support); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
156.404 (Vernon 1996) (same).
75. See CARL E. SCHNEIDER & MARGARET F. BRINIG, AN INVITATION TO FAMILY
LAW: PRINCIPLES, PROCESS AND PERSPECTIVES 677 (1996).
76. Mentock v. Mentock, 638 P.2d 156, 158 (Wyo. 1981); accord McCartor v. Parr 612
S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981).
77. See Stephen J. Bahr et al., Trends in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal of
Maternal Preference Made a Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 264 (1994).
78. See Marvin M. Moore, The Significance of a Divorced Father 's Remarriage in Adjudicating a Motion to Modify His Child Support Obligations, 18 CAP. U. L. REV. 483 (1989).
79. See Polikoff, supra note 33, at 179.
80. See id.
81. Court of Common Pleas, Butler County, A.O. No. 79-371, Book 1 14 Page 188, va
cated by G.J.F. v. K.B.F., 425 A.2d 459 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981).
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The historical roots of the development of the child support obliga
tion show that it was intended to work with custody as a means of en
suring children's best interests. Before the child support obligation be
came part of divorce proceedings, custody was often awarded to
parents based purely on their independent abilities to support their
children financially.82 Women were only rarely able to win custody of
their children under this standard even though, at that time, the dis
parity between men's and women's emotional involvement in the lives
of their children was likely greater than today. One of the major ad
vantages of the duty of post-divorce child support is that children are
able to live with the parent to whom they are more attached, while at
the same time receiving adequate resources. Allowing judges to use
child custody decisions to lessen child support payments abandons this
desirable flexibility, and thus jeopardizes the interests of children.
Focusing on the availability of child support, then, does not pro
vide a justification for the complete elimination of the consideration of
wealth. It does, however, provide another reason why, all things con
sidered, it is better for children if parental wealth is not taken into ac
count. Disallowing consideration of wealth in deciding custody allows
custody and child support to be more effectively used together to se
cure children's well-being.
D. Incentive Effects
Children's welfare is also aided by removal of some of the incen
tives caused by inclusion of wealth as a factor in custody decisions.
The substantive rules of adjudication influence the behavior of par
ents. Eliminating consideration of wealth eliminates undesirable in
centives for divorcing parents, such as the incentive for parents who
have little to offer other than wealth to litigate, and the incentive to
impoverish the other parent and child pending custody determina
tions.
Inclusion of wealth as a factor inserts another variable that can
give parents with a marginal chance of success an incentive to liti
gate,83 subjecting the child to a very difficult process.84 Any constraint
on judicial discretion in custody determinations would of course re
duce litigation, and consequently spare children a degree of agony.85
82. See Polikoff, supra note 33, at 176; Donna Schuele, Origins and Development of the
Law of Parental Child Support, 27 J. FAM. L. 807, 818-20 (1988/1989).
83. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 959-66 (1979); Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental
Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CAL. L. REV. 615, 643 (1992).
84. See generally Elster, supra note 22; Robert Burt, Experts, Custody Disputes & Legal
Fantasies, 14 PSYCHIATRIC HOSP. 140 (1982).
85. See generally Elster, supra note 22.
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One commentator has even suggested that deciding custody through a
coin flip would be more desirable than the present system.86 The need
to enable settlement and avoid litigation by constraining judicial dis
cretion was one of the concerns underlying the creation of West
Virginia's primary caretaker presumption, a common law rule that
constrains judicial discretion by establishing a preference for awarding
custody to the parent who had provided most of the daily care of the
child.87
But not all devices that constrain or decrease litigation are worth
adopting. The procedural advantages of constraints on discretion
sometimes come at a substantive cost. Children have an interest in
achieving certain substantive custody outcomes as well as avoiding dif
ficult processes. Thus, the advantages of lessening litigation need to be
weighed against the disadvantage of losing judicial power to choose
better placements for children. A random process like the suggested
coin flip is not tailored toward eliminating litigation in any particular
class of cases likely to lead to undesirable substantive outcomes. Using
random measures, children will certainly end up in less desirable
placements a significant amount of the time.88
The common law rule eliminating consideration of wealth is a
compelling means of reducing litigation because it is tailored to a class
of cases where eliminating the rule is also likely to correlate with bet
ter substantive outcomes. As we have seen, a rule eliminating consid
erations of wealth can enhance the quality of substantive decisions
about custody. At its extremes, this rule will discourage parents who
have little claim to custody other than financial advantage (which is of
limited value compared to other parental features)89 from litigating
their custody disputes. The rule proposed here is much more like the
presumption that a child should be placed with her primary care
taker,90 which limits discretion in a way that also generally correlates
with desirable substantive outcomes.
Elimination of wealth also lessens another troublesome practice,
money-for-custody trades. For this reason, children of parents who
eventually settle out of court will be better off with a custody rule that
eliminates consideration of this factor. Wide discretion in custody out
comes leads to uncertain results; parents who are not willing to risk
losing custody of their children (often the most committed parents)
86. Elster, supra note 22, at 40-43. Contra Herring, supra note 43, at 232-37 (id<!ntifying
advantages and disadvantages of the coin-flip solution and concluding that the latter out
weigh the former).
87. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
88. A random process may also carry with it a distressing message of societal indiffer
ence, which itself may be harmful to parents and children.
89. See supra Section LC.
90. See Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
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may not be willing to enter litigation. In their settlements, they may
sacrifice property division and child support arrangements in order to
ensure custody.91 This leaves children without the benefit of those fi
nancial resources, and, on the whole, worse off.92
Removing the ability of parents to use wealth as a weapon in pri
vate bargains addresses this problem directly. Aiming the common law
rule at parents who have little to offer other than financial gain is a
very finely tuned means of addressing the financial bargaining prob
lem. It would most commonly remove a bargaining tool from the
wealthier parent in situations where the financial disparity between
the parties is the greatest. It is precisely in these situations where a
parent whose claim to custody would otherwise be weak, that a parent
would be able to credibly litigate on the basis of financial advantage.
The children of these parents have the most to lose when one parent
sacrifices a financial settlement for custody.
Finally, eliminating wealth as a factor in custody disputes discour
ages a noncustodial parent from stopping voluntary support payments
to the custodial parent and children before the litigation is settled, as a
means of ensuring that the financial disparities between the parties
will appear more pronounced.93 This sort of behavior clearly works
against the interests of children. Thus, removing consideration of
wealth discourages some of the least beneficial litigation and bad bar
gaining behavior outside of litigation to the benefit of the children in
volved in these cases.
III. DEFENDING THE EXCEPTION
Despite the arguments above, that considering wealth is actually
against children's interests, setting a floor - consideration of a par
ent's ability to provide for the child's basic needs - can be justified.
The arguments against considering wealth when the minimum can be
met typically fall apart when children are in danger of being deprived
91. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TwENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 89 (1995); Scott Altman, Lurking
in the Shadow, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 493, 498-510 (1995); Glendon, supra note 17, at 1182-83;
Saul Levmore, Joint Custody and Strategic Behavior, 73 IND. L.J. 429, 432 (1998). This was a
major motivation behind the crafting of the primary caretaker presumption in Garska v.
McCoy.
There is some reason to believe that these custody trades may not actually occur, at least
not very frequently. See ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE
CHILD 44-49 (1992); Schneider, supra note 17, at 2274-79. But see Altman, supra, at 498-510.
92. See Scott, supra note 83, at 645; see also Nancy D. Polikoff, Gender and Child
Custody Determinations: Exploding the Myths, in FAMILIES, POLITICS, AND PuBLIC POLICY
183 (Irene Diamond ed., 1983).
93. See Horne, supra note 13, at 2124 (citing Collins v. Collins, No. CA 89-333, 1990 WL
160412 (Ark. Ct. App. Oct. 17, 1990) and Driver v. Driver, No. 89-385-11, 1 990 WL 100422
(Tenn. Ct. App. July 20, 1990) as examples of cases where this strategy apparently met with

success).
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of the essentials of existence. Here, forcing courts to ignore basic
needs would run up against the goal of child neglect statutes. Soon af
ter the child was placed with the parent who could not provide for ba
sic needs, child protective services involvement would become immi
nent, and the child would most likely be eventually removed to the
home of the parent with greater resources, anyway.94 The concerns
about inaccuracy in decisionmaking if these factors are considered is
greatly decreased - while overvaluation of the importance of mar
ginal degrees of wealth between parents may be inevitable, it is not
likely that the importance of children being well fed, or receiving basic
medical care, could be given too much weight.95
The importance of a minimum also suggests an option for courts
working within states where consideration of parental wealth is man
dated by statute, such as in Michigan and Florida;96 these courts could
read the statute to only require consideration of these basic human
needs. The focus of the language of these statutory provisions is on the
basics of human survival - food, clothing, medical care - and not on
the more marginal benefits of having one's own room, or having more
expensive toys. Michigan's statutory language requires consideration
of "the capacity and disposition of the parties involved to provide the
child with food, clothing, medical care or other remedial care recog
nized and permitted under the laws of this state in place of medical
care, and other material needs."97 Florida's statutory language is al
most identical. Even the catch all at the end is phrased as "other mate
rial needs," not other material benefits or advantages.98 It is thus quite
possible to consider these statutory provisions as only setting forth a
requirement of consideration of minimum financial provision. Thus,
even those states who seem to require consideration of parental
wealth in making child custody decisions can adopt the suggested rule.

94. Child neglect Jaw does not officially allow termination of parental rights, unless the
neglect is intentional. But custody modification is a tool employed by child protective agen
cies to solve the problems associated with non-intentional neglect. LEROY H. PELTON, FOR
REASONS OF POVERTY: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PUBLIC CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM
IN THE UNITED STATES (1989).
95. The notion is that wealth is "conditionally relevant" - it is not relevant to children's
best interests more generally, but it is relevant to the ability of a parent to meet bask needs.
See generally Richard D. Friedman, Conditional Probative Value: Neoclassicism Without
Myth, 93 MICH. L. REV. 439 (1994) (arguing that the concept of conditional relevance is an
essential aspect of the classical model of evidentiary Jaw).
96. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(c) (West 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(3)
(West 1993).
97. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.23(3) (West 1993).
98. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(3)(c) (West 1994).
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CONCLUSION

This Note has argued that, despite the clear relevance of wealth to
the determination of children's best interests, it may be in the interests
of children to eliminate consideration of that factor in all cases except
those implicating minimal subsistence. Of course, only family court
judges, using their experience and the unique skill that comes from it
(what Karl Llewellyn called "situation sense"99), know how these con
siderations play out in the context of real-life custody disputes. The
delicate balancing required in making difficult custody decisions in the
interests of children depends at least partly on knowledge few others
than these judges possess.100 Some judges have indeed decided that, all
things considered, it is best not to consider parental wealth when
making these decisions.101 This Note has provided some structure to
their concerns, and the beginnings of an analysis that will hopefully
encourage more courts to consider eliminating consideration of wealth
in custody disputes in the interests of children.

99. See KARL L. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS
126-28 (1960).
100. This suggests a reason to prefer the promulgation of these rules through common
law rulemaking rather than by statute.
101. See supra notes 15, 16.

